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Which preferences associate with school performance?  
Lessons from a university classroom experiment 
 
Dániel Horn - Hubert János Kiss 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We attempt to link laboratory-based measures of preferences with measures of school 
performance. We measure in an incentivized way risk, time, social and competitive 
preferences and also cognitive abilities of university students and look for associations 
between these measures and two important academic outcome measures: exam results and 
GPA. 
We find consistently that cognitive abilities (proxied by the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(Frederick 2005)) are very well correlated with school performance. Regarding non-cognitive 
skills, we find suggestive evidence for many of our measured preferences. We use two 
alternative measures of time preference: patience and present bias. Present bias explains 
exam grades relatively better, while patience is better explaining GPA. Both measures of time 
preferences have a non-linear relation to school performance. Competitiveness matters, as 
students, who opt for a more competitive payment scheme in our experiments have a higher 
average GPA and better exam grades. We observe also that risk-averse students perform a 
little better than risk-loving students. That makes sense in case of multiple choice exams, 
because risk-loving students may want to try to pass the exam less prepared, as the possibility 
of passing as exam just by chance is not zero. Finally, we have also detected that cooperative 
preferences – the amount of money offered in a public good game – associates strongly with 
GPA, but in a non-linear way. Students who offered around half of their possible amounts 
had significantly higher GPAs than those, who offered none or all their money.  
 
Keywords: competititive preferences, experiment, non-cognitive skills, risk preferences, 
school performance, social preferences, time preferences. 
 
JEL codes: C91; D91; I20 
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Melyik preferenciák függnek össze az iskolai 
teljesítménnyel? 
Tanulságok egy egyetemi kísérletből 
Horn Dániel – Kiss Hubert János 
 
Összefoglaló 
Laboratóriumban gyakran használt preferenciákat mérünk és azt vizsgáljuk, hogy mennyire 
függnek össze iskolai teljesítmény mérőszámaival. Ösztönzött módon mérjük egyetemi 
hallgatók kockázati, idő-, társas és versengési preferenciáit és kognitív képességeit és 
megnézzük, hogy ezen mértékek mennyire mozognak együtt két fontos 
teljesítménymutatóval: vizsgaeredményekkel és tanulmányi átlaggal. 
Azt találjuk, hogy a kognitív képességek (amit a Cognitive Reflection Test-tel (Frederick 
2005) mérünk) konzisztens módon korrelálnak az iskolai teljesítménnyel. A nem-kognitív 
képességek közül sok függ össze a fenti teljesítménymutatókkal. Az időpreferenciát 
kétféleképpen mérjük: a türelemmel és a jelen-torzítással. A jelen-torzítás a 
vizsgaeredményeket, míg a türelem a tanulmányi átlagokat magyarázza jobban. Mindkét 
időpreferencia-mutató nem-lineáris összefüggést mutat az iskolai teljesítménnyel. A 
versenyszellem is számít, ugyanis magasabb a tanulmányi átlaguk és jobbak a 
vizsgaeredményeik azon diákoknak, akik versengő kifizetést választottak a kísérletünkben. 
Megmutatjuk, hogy a kockázatkerülőbb diákok jobban teljesítenek a vizsgán, mint a 
kockázatkedvelőbb társaik. Ez azért lehetséges, mert feleletválasztós vizsga esetén a 
kockázatkedvelő diák megpróbálkozhat kevésbé felkészülten átmenni a vizsgán, hiszen ennek 
esélye nem nulla. Végül, azt is találjuk, hogy a kooperatív preferenciák – a közjószág-játékban 
felajánlott összeg – erősen összefügg a tanulmányi átlaggal, nem-lineáris módon. Azon 
diákok tanulmányi átlaga, akik megközelítőleg a lehetséges összeg felét ajánlották fel, 
számottevően magasabb volt, mint azoké, akik semmit vagy mindent felajánlottak. 
 
Tárgyszavak: versengési preferencia, kísérlet, nem-kognitív képességek, kockázati 
preferencia, iskolai teljesítmény, társas preferencia, időpreferencia. 
 
JEL-kódok: C91; D91; I20 
 
Köszönetnyilvánítás: Nagyon hálásak vagyunk Péntek Zsófiának a kísérlet elvégzéséhez 
nyújtott segítségéért. 
5 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There is growing literature that indicates that individual preferences studied by economists 
affect and predict a wide range of choices made at the individual level. For example, risky 
choices like smoking, drinking, not having insurance, holding stocks rather than Treasury 
bills or choosing an occupation with a high earning risks are positively and significantly 
correlated with risk attitudes (see for instance Barsky et al, 1997; Bonin et al., 2007; Dohmen 
et al., 2010). Similarly, time discounting predicts behavior in many walks of life like health 
(e.g. BMI - see for instance Borghans and Golsteyn, 2006) or finance (e.g. creditworthiness – 
see for example Meier and Sprenger, 2011; or savings – see Falk et al. 2015), labour supply 
and lifetime income (see Chabris et al., 2008; Golsteyn et al., 2014; Komlos et al., 2004).1  
In this study, we focus on educational performance. Using a classroom experiment we 
attempt to see which preferences may affect school performance. Understanding the factors 
that shape school performance is of utmost importance, because school performance 
determines to a large extent the success in life as captured, for instance by the wage premium 
(e.g. Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004) or the positive relation between schooling and other 
socioeconomic outcomes (e.g. health – see for instance Grossmann 2006, or voting – see 
Geys 2006). We consider both cognitive and non-cognitive skills (preferences) and try to 
measure some of them in the classroom.2 Then we relate the measures obtained to two 
measures of observable school performance of bachelor students: the exam result of a subject 
(Economics) and the grade point average (henceforth, GPA) of the semester when the exam 
was taken. 
More precisely, we study four interrelated preferences that have received considerable 
academic attention in the last decades: risk, time, social and competitive preferences. These 
areas are interrelated as for instance any temporal choice involves risk as the future is 
inherently uncertain (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012). Therefore, measures of these 
preferences may be correlated, as we show later.3 Why is it important to consider the 
association between these preferences and school performance? We know that academic 
                                                 
1 Two remarks are in order. First, the relationships are not always unambigous, for example for time 
discounting and health see Chapman and Elstein, 1995 and Chapman et al.,1999. Second, in many 
cases not all measures related to a preference have a predictive power, only some of them (see 
Chapman and Coups, 1999, Meier and Sprenger, 2010). 
2 Note that cognitive and non-cognitive skills are not orthogonal abilities as for instance cognition 
affects many aspects of human behavior (Borghans et al., 2008).  
3 We note that gender differences have been documented extensively regarding these preferences (see 
Croson-Gneezy (2009) or Niederle (2016) for two surveys). However, since our subject pool is not 
balanced regarding gender, we do not focus on this aspect. 
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success depends positively and to a large extent on intellectual ability. Borghans et al. (2008) 
report that IQ predicts outcomes in several fields of life (e.g. job performance and longevity) 
and is the best predictor for two academic outcomes (college grades and years of education) 
when compared to the Big Five personality factors. While the importance of cognitive 
abilities to explain academic success is a general finding, many studies also point out that 
they rarely explain more than 50% of the variance in academic performance (Chamorro-
Premuzic & Furnham, 2004; O’Connor & Paunonen, 2007).4 Duckworth and Seligman 
(2005) show in a longitudinal study that self-control explained more than twice as much 
variance in the final grades of eigth-grade students as IQ. In fact, the part not explained by 
cognitive skills is perhaps best understood considering personality traits and preferences.  
We report here briefly our main results. In line with the existing literature, we find that 
cognitive abilities are important both for exam results and GPA. We consider two aspects of 
time preferences, patience and present bias and they affect exam results and GPA in the 
expected way. Patience is non-linear as it matters only for the very impatient. Also future-
biased and time-consistent students perform similarly well, but better than present-biased 
student. The more present-biased a student is, the worse her expected grades are. Risk 
preferences seem to affect the exam result in the following way: the more risk-averse a 
student, the better are the exam results. Although, this relationship is very weak, to our best 
knowledge, we are the first to find significant effect of risk/uncertanity aversion on school 
performance (even though this finding is only partial as it affects only exam results). 
Competitive preferences are weakly related to exam results and GPA in the expected way. 
That is, the more competitive a student is, the higher is her grade.5 We find an interesting 
non-linear effect of social preferences: compared to those who contribute nothing / 
everything to a public good, those who contributed half of their endowment, fared 
significantly better regarding their GPA.6  
The differential effect of the preferences on exam results and GPA may be due to the 
different nature of these two. The exam that we use to measure school performance was an 
Economics exam for students not enrolled in the Economics program, so it was not a major 
or important subject in their track. On the other hand, GPA encompasses all subjects, giving 
a more balanced view of school performance. Moreover, the exam was a multiple choice test 
with clear good answer, hence there the grade can be seen as an objective measure. However, 
                                                 
4 In fact, Borghans and colleagues (2016) report much smaller, below 0.1, R2-statistics of IQ on wages 
using the British Cohort Study or the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth ’79. 
5 Related to competitiveness, we find also that more overconfident students do worse in the exams but 
not in GPA. 
6 A caveat on social preferences is in order. Our analysis is carried out on an individual level, while 
cooperativeness may be important on the group or class level. Hence, classes that exhibit a higher 
degree of cooperativeness may be more successful academically, ceteris paribus. If this is the case, 
then social preferences should be measured and compared on the group level. 
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in the GPA there may be subjects that are not evaluated only on such objective scales. For 
example, oral exams or written assignments in form of an essay seem to let subjectivity play a 
larger role in grading. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Next, we review briefly the preferences that 
we study and also potential connections to educational attainment. We also formulate some 
hypotheses about how these preferences may affect school performance. Then in section 3 we 
present the experiment and validate our measurement of the preferences. Section 4 contains 
the results that considers both linear and non-linear relationships. In section 5 we discuss the 
results and outline some possible venues for future research. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1  TIME PREFERENCE 
Time preferences are important as many decisions involve costs and benefits that occur at 
different points in time. Many individuals tend to try to enjoy the benefits as soon as possible, 
while delaying costs and efforts. For instance, the marshmallow tests showed that the ability 
to delay gratification is positively related to many desirable behaviors and outcomes (for 
instance, better health, higher average SAT points, more rewarding social relationships, see 
Mischel 1996, Sutter et al. 2013).  
Following the literature we consider two aspects of time preference: patience and present 
bias. The choice between different amounts of money at different points in time may reveal 
the implied discount factor that characterizes an individual. The more an individual values 
future payoffs, the more patient she is and probably the more she is willing to sacrifice to get 
those future rewards. When the discount factor is measured on different horizons, but 
involving the same time interval (say, now vs. 1 week later and in a year vs. in a year and a 
week), then the difference in discount rates on the different horizons is also informative. If an 
individual is more impatient on the short-term horizon than on the long-term, then she 
exhibits present bias that may make it hard for the individual to make efforts immediately, 
and she tends to procrastinate efforts and costs. Other studies relate these concepts to 
willpower and self-control.7  
How do time preferences affect education outcomes? It is natural to think that those 
students who are more patient and hence value the future more and / or who are more able 
to delay gratification (that is, make efforts and study instead of playing or hanging around), 
                                                 
7 Several studies (see for example the survey by Bucciol et al. (2010) and the references therein) note 
that self-control and willpower are limited resources and can be exhausted, a process described by 
psychologist as ego depletion. 
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will be more successful academically. There is some empirical evidence in this regard. 
Golsteyn et al. (2014) use longitudinal data from Sweden that links measured time preference 
at age 13 to later life outcomes gained from administrative registers. Their results indicate 
that high discount rates are related to worse school performance, among others. More patient 
individuals had significantly higher grades throughout the school years and were more likely 
to attain a university diploma. They also show that the effect operates through early human 
capital investments.8 Cadena and Keys (2015) report very similar findings in an US setting 
and Falk et al. (2015) also show in a world-wide survey that patience is signiﬁcantly related to 
educational attainment. Sutter et al. (2013) find evidence that children and adolescents in 
Austria who are more impatient show worse conduct during school years (smoke more and 
drink more alcohol). Castillo et al. (2011) document similar findings in the US. However, the 
empirical findings are not unambiguous as Bettinger and Slonim (2007) fail to find any 
correlation between patience and school performance. 
Similarly to the above-cited studies, in our experiment we used intertemporal monetary 
choices to measure individual patience of the participants over two horizons. As a 
consequence, we can measure both patience and present bias.  
Hypothesis 1 (Time preference): Based on the literature we conjecture that patience has a 
positive and present bias may have a negative effect on school performance. 
2.2  RISK PREFERENCES 
Even though generally we speak only about risk preferences, recent research has revealed 
that risk and uncertainty (or ambiguity) – though related – are different concepts. Broadly 
speaking, risk preferences capture how much individuals value safe and certain outcomes 
relative to risky (when probabilities of different events are known) or uncertain (when those 
probabilities are unknown) alternatives.  
There is some evidence that risk preferences are related to schooling, but the direction of 
the effect is unclear. For instance, Guiso and Paiella (2008) show that more educated people 
are more risk tolerant, but we do not know if schooling makes individual less risk-averse or 
risk aversion affects schooling decisions. Analyzing an Italian panel data set Belzil and 
Leonardi (2007) find that risk attitudes only modestly explain whether an individual is 
admitted to higher education or not. Sutter et al. (2013) find that experimental measures of 
risk and uncertainty aversion predict field behavior in the school only weakly. Hartlaub and 
Schneider (2012) discuss how risk aversion and social background affect school choice and 
show compelling evidence in favour of the class-specific effect of risk aversion in Germany. 
                                                 
8 Importantly, the authors control for a host of potential confounds. For instance, there is some 
evidence that time preferences and cognitive abilities are related (Dohmen et al. (2010) and Burks et 
al. (2009)), but cognitive abilities are controlled for in the study. 
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Importantly, we study the association between risk attitudes and school performance, a topic 
not touched upon in the cited papers. 
We note that risk and time preferences may be correlated. For instance, Leigh (1986) 
reports a significant negative correlation between time discount and risk aversion. Anderhub 
et al. (2001) find a statistically significant negative correlation between risk aversion and 
discount factors in a within-subject design. However, being correlated does not mean that 
they are the same. In an experiment, Coble and Lusk (2010) reject the hypothesis that risk 
and time preferences are governed by a single parameter and conclude that the relationship 
between the two is that individuals prefer to delay the resolution of risk. Andreoni and 
Sprenger (2012) also state that while risk and time preferences are intertwined, they are not 
different manifestations of the same phenomenon. Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015) show that 
risk attitudes and time discounting are related through various channels, for example both 
risk tolerance and patience are on average higher for payoffs that materialize in the future 
compared to payoffs in the present. Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015) offer a unifying framework 
to capture all the interactions. In this study, we do not investigate the mechanisms that relate 
time and risk preferences, and they are not significantly correlated according to our data.  
Hypothesis 2 (Risk preference): Based on the literature we do not expect a strong effect of 
risk attitudes on school performance.  
2.3  SOCIAL PREFERENCES 
Social preferences express the idea that other individuals’ utility also enters the utility 
function of the decision-maker. It includes many aspects of human behavior ranging from 
trust and reciprocity to cooperation. 
It seems plausible that in a more trusting and cooperative environment students help 
each other improving educational attainment in general. There is scant evidence that social 
preferences and especially prosocial behavior is related to school performance. Using Italian 
data, Caprara et al. (2000) find that prosocial attitude measured at age 8 predicted 
educational performance and peer acceptance 5 years later.9 This study did not use 
experiments but assessment reported by the children themselves and teachers. We are not 
aware of any paper that uses experiments to relate prosocial behavior to school performance.  
We focused on cooperation and measured it in our experiment with a two-person variant 
of the public goods game. There are studies that show that choice in the public goods game is 
generally positively related to effort in the field, see for instance Englmaier and Gebhardt 
(2016) or Galizzi and Navarro-Martinez (2015). That is why we conjecture that larger 
                                                 
9 Layous et al. (2012) also report that prosociality is related to peer acceptance, suggesting a potential 
link between prosocial attitudes, peer effects and educational attainment. 
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contribution in this game may imply more effort in studying that eventually results in better 
performance, ceteris paribus.  
Hypothesis 3 (Cooperativeness): We expect that cooperativeness goes well with higher 
school performance. 
2.4  COMPETITIVE PREFERENCES 
Competitive preferences may be important in school performance as individuals that are 
competitive may want to excel at school as well. The only study that we are aware of in this 
regard is Azmat and Iriberri (2010) who find such results in a natural field experiment during 
which students in a high school in Spain received for a year information that allowed them to 
know if they performed above or below the class average and the distance from the average. 
The provision of this information increased students’ grades by 5%.  
Hypothesis 4 (Competitiveness): Based on Azmat and Iriberri (2010) we expect that more 
competitive participants may have better results in the exam, ceteris paribus. 
3. THE EXPERIMENT 
There were 3 sessions, all of them carried out during university lectures. In total 226 students 
(144 women) participated in the experiment. Subjects were undergraduate students enrolled 
in different programs of the Eötvös Lóránd University (Budapest, Hungary). No student 
participated in more than one session. The first / second / third session was carried out on 17 
November, 2015 / 27 November, 2015 / 3 December, 2015 with students mainly enrolled in 
International Affairs  and Computer Science. Each session lasted about 40-45 minutes. 
The experiment was a paper and pencil experiment. After seating the participants, they 
received the instruction sheets that also contained the situations in which the participants 
had to decide. At the beginning of each session an experimenter read aloud the relevant 
information that the participants could also follow on the instruction sheets.10 More 
precisely, we made clear that participation was voluntary and anonymous. We also explained 
that we wished to connect answers in the experiment to school performance of the subject so 
we asked the participants to provide their code of the electronic education administration 
system. Providing the code was also voluntary and we pointed out that after connecting the 
data we would erase the code to make identification impossible. Next, we explained that the 
experiment would consists of six independent decisions and that at the end of the experiment 
we would select two participants randomly who would be paid according to their decisions in 
                                                 
10 For the exact instructions, see Appendix A. 
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one of the randomly chosen decisions.11 We also made clear that some of the payments 
related to some of the decisions may be postponed to 2 or 3 weeks later and explained 
carefully how they would receive the money in these cases. After all these explanations the 
experimenter answered the questions that emerged. 
Participants made the decisions in the six situations using the instruction sheet that 
explained the scenarios with examples.  
The first decision measured cooperation with a two-person public goods game. We 
explained on the instruction sheet that the participants would be randomly matched with 
another participant in the experiment and both start with an endowment of 4000 Ft (12.7 
EUR / 14.1 USD) and could contribute any amount of this endowment to a common account, 
without knowing the contribution of the co-player. Each of them would receive 70% of the 
total contributions to the common account, independently of the individual contribution. The 
final payoff is the sum of the money from the common account plus the endowment that has 
not been used for contribution. We also made clear that if at the end of the experiment this 
situation is chosen for payoff, then we would pick randomly two participants and pay 
according to their decisions. Note that optimal decision from an individual point of view is to 
contribute zero to the common account, as a unit contribution returns only 0.7, that is the 
marginal benefit is less than the marginal cost. However, from a societal point of view 
contributing all the endowment is the optimal decision as a unit contribution generates 2*0.7 
units. We consider the contribution to the common account as a natural measure of 
cooperation: the more a participant contributes the more cooperative she is.  
The second decision meant to gauge the risk attitude of the participants. Similarly to 
Sutter et al. (2013), we elicited risk (and uncertainty) attitudes using the Ellsberg two-color 
choice task (Ellsberg, 1961).  We told the participants that a bag contained 10 black and 10 
red balls and we would draw one ball from the bag. Each participant was endowed with 3000 
Ft (9.5 EUR/ 10.6 USD) and could choose the color to bet on and the amount to bet on the 
color of the ball drawn. We explained that if the participant guesses correctly the color of the 
ball, then we would double the bet. We consider the amount of the bet as a natural measure 
of risk aversion: the less a participant bets the more risk-averse she is.12 We also explained 
that if this decision is chosen for payoffs, then we would again pick randomly two 
participants, carry out the drawing of the ball and pay according to their decisions. 
The third decision was similar to the previous one, but we wanted to capture uncertainty 
aversion. Therefore, in this case the distribution of the balls in the bag was unknown to the 
                                                 
11 The instruction sheets were numbered and each had two additional tags with the number of the 
sheet. When handing in the sheets, participants kept one of this number tags and the other was used to 
select the two participants to be paid. 
12 In the analysis below we will use the amount not placed on the bet as a measure of risk aversion. 
12 
 
participants. Again they were endowed with 3000 Ft (9.5 EUR/ 10.6 USD) and could choose 
the color to bet on and the amount to bet on the color of the ball drawn. The payoffs were as 
before: we doubled the bet if the the bet was correct.13 
Decision 4 and 5 tested time preferences. More concretely, we used choices from two 
multiple price lists in which participants were asked to make a series of decisions between a 
smaller reward (Forint X) in period t and a larger reward (Forint Y >= Forint X) in period τ. 
We kept Forint Y constant and varied Forint X in two time frames, corresponding to the two 
decisions. In decision 4 we asked participants if they preferred 2400 Forints (7.6 Eur / 8.5 
USD), 2500 Forints, 2600 Forints and so on up to 3500 Forints (11.1 EUR / 12.4 USD) today 
instead of 3500 Forints in a week. Based on previous experiments we expected that in the 
first decisions participants would choose the later, but substantially larger payoff, while in the 
last decisions they would switch to the earlier payoff. Based on the switching point we can 
calculate a proxy of their individual discount rate or patience over this horizon (now vs. 1 
week later).14 The closer is the switching point to 3500 Forints, the smaller is the individual 
discount rate / the more patient is the student. Decision 5 was identical, but there the earlier 
/ later decision referred to amounts to be received in two / three weeks. For that decision 
problem we can also use the switching point to calculate the individual discount rate for each 
participant. Individual discount rates over these horizons are interesting per se, as previous 
work has shown that the degree of patience predicts behavior (see examples in the 
Introduction). Moreover, the relative magnitude of these patience measures reveals if 
somebody is present-biased or not. If the individual discount rate in decision 4 is larger, than 
that in decision 5, then the individual is more impatient over the short run, than over the long 
run and suffers present bias. Present bias may affect many decisions as a direct consequence 
of it is procrastination. Several studies indicate that students tend to procrastinate in their 
academic tasks, see for instance Solomon and Rothblum (1984), Steel (2007) or experimental 
evidence (Ariely and Wertenbroch 2002, Burger, Charness and Lyndham 2011).15 Present 
bias implies that the individual has difficulties to delay gratification and this – as explained 
before – may affect academic achievement. Those that exhibit the reverse relationship are 
                                                 
13 Randomly allocated, either after decision 3 or 5 there was an optional extra task. It represented a 
maze and we put clearly that it is not necessary to solve this exercise, but those who do it successfully 
would receive an extra 300 Forints (0.95 EUR / 1.1 USD) if chosen to be paid at the end of the 
experiment. The idea of including the maze was to see if ego depletion affects the completion of this 
task. We found no effect and since it is not tightly related to the rest of the paper, we ignore this task 
henceforth. 
14 It is only a proxy as the indifference point between the 3500 Ft to be received in a week and the 
money immediately is between the switching point and the previous choice. Thus, if somebody prefers 
3500 Ft in a week to 3200 Ft now, but then chooses 3300 Ft now instead of 3500 Ft in a week, then 
her indifference point is between 3200 and 3300 Ft. 
15 There is a wide range of real-world phenomena affected by present bias, for example credit-card 
borrowing (Meier and Sprenger 2010), saving decisions (Laibson 1997 and Beshears et al. 2008) or 
physical exercise ((DellaVigna and Malmendier) to name a few. 
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called future-biased.16 We measure present bias as the difference of the switching points on 
the two horizons (switching point at later horizin minus switching point at earlier horizon). 
Therefore, if a participant switches from the 3500 Ft in a week to the earlier payoff at 2800 
Ft, but then on the later horizon she switches at 3000 Ft, then her present bias measure is 
200 Ft. 
Three remarks are in order. First, in other experiments these time preference tests 
involve a farther away time horizon for the second set of questions. For instance, Meier and 
Sprenger (2010) use now vs. 1 week and 6 weeks vs. 7 weeks, Dean and Ortoleva (2015) use 
now vs. 1 week and 5/6 weeks vs.6/ 7 weeks. However, in our case, we had to opt for a shorter 
timeframe as Christmas break was approaching which could have jeopardized the payment 
(had it been selected). Second, we explained carefully that if the payment involved getting 
paid later, then the participants would receive the corresponding amount of money in an 
envelope from the teacher of the course that we used to carry out the experiment.17 Third, we 
had the time preference tasks close together. Individuals attempting to be consistent may 
have remembered their switching point in decision 4 and make the same choice in decision 5. 
Hence, possibly we underestimate present bias. 
After decision 5 we had an 8-item test, see Appendix A for the exact questions. The first 
three questions were a variant of the cognitive reflection test (Frederick, 2005). We 
reformulated the questions and used different numbers to minimize the possibility that 
somebody remembered the questions and the right answers from some earlier experience. 
The rest of the questions involved general and popular knowledge (e.g. How many verses are 
there in an elegiac couplet?; How many seasons did the series Friends have?). We asked the 
participants how many of the questions they thought they answered correctly. They could 
have received 250 Forints plus, if they guessed correctly. The difference between this guess 
and the actual number of correct answers is a measure of overconfidence.  The test served as 
a basis for decision 6 in which participants had to decide how they would like to be paid for 
their correct answers in the test. They could choose a flat-rate compensation of 250 Forints 
(0.79 EUR / 0.88 USD) per correct answer (maximum amount to be received this way is 
2000 Forints (6.3 EUR / 7.1 USD)) or a competitive compensation that consisted in picking 
randomly two other participants and compare the number of correct answers. If the 
participant to be paid had more / an equal number of / less correct answers than the better 
one of the two randoméy chosen students, then she would receive 4500 / 2500 / 0 Forints 
(14.3 / 7.9 / 0 EUR 15.9 / 8.8 / 0 USD). The choice of the second compensation scheme 
reveals competitive preferences in a binary way. 
                                                 
16 Future bias implies to delay taking a reward, a strange phenomenon at first sight. It has received 
scarce attention, see Loewenstein (1987), Rubinstein (2006) or Sayman and Öncüler (2009). 
17 We also added that if there was any problem with the payment, they should contact the secretary of 
the Department of Economics. 
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The number of correct answers to the first three questions measures cognitive skills. 
Several studies (Frederick 2005; Obrecht et al. 2009, Toplak et al. 2011) report a statistically 
significant correlation of about 0.4 between CRT performance and cognitive abilities. 
After the 6 decisions we gathered some additional information and asked the gender, the 
year of birth and the highest level of education of the participant. 
After everybody participating in the experiment handed in the instruction sheets with the 
answers, we rolled a die to determine which of the 6 decisions determines the payoffs and 
picked randomly two participants. We looked their corresponding decisions and paid on the 
spot.18  
3.1  MEASUREMENT VALIDATION AND DESCRIPTIVES OF THE PREFERENCES 
Our main objective is to see which preferences correlate with school performance and we can 
draw strong conclusions only if we can validate our preference measures. Table 1 below 
summarizes our main measures. Altogether we have more than 200 observations, but only 
have exam or GPA grades for around 150. We kept the variables unstandardized, which 
makes interpretation easier. Although for some variables we have divided the number by 100 
(for time and risk preferences), so that the coefficients are more easily readable. 
Time now / later represent our time preference measures on the shorter (now vs. 1 week) 
and longer (2 vs 3 weeks) horizons. The mean indicates that relative to the 3500 Ft to be 
received at the later date when do they switch to the earlier amount. Hence, 273 in Time now 
shows that on average our subjects’ indifference point is 3500-273=3227. we also compute 
the corresponding discount factors that are in line with those found in the literature, see for 
instance Frederick et al. (2002). Risk and uncertainty show the attitude toward uncertainty 
as the amount that the participants not placed on the bet.  Present bias, as explained above, 
measures the difference in the switching points of the two time horizons.19 In experiments 
about one third of the participants is found to be present biased (see Meier and Sprenger 
2010, Dohmen et al. 2006 and Ashraf et al. 2006), while in our experiment it is 30 per cent. 
Cooperativeness is gauged as the contribution to the common project in the public goods 
game that may range from 0 to 4000. In public goods game this contribution usually 
amounts to 40-60 per cent of the initial endowment (see Chaudhuri 2011). The mean in our 
experiment is at the upper end of this range. Competitiveness is a binary measure that is 1 for 
those who chose the competitive compensation scheme after the quiz and is 0 for those who 
                                                 
18 The random choice of the payoff-relevant decision never was one of the time preference tasks 
(decision 4 and 5) that may have involved delayed payment. 
19 Here we present the difference that can be either positive or negative. However, remember that the 
definition of present bias is that somebody is more impatient now than later, so for these individuals 
the present bias measure is positive. Those with a negative measure are future-biased, while time 
consistent individuals have a present bias of zero. 
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opted for a piece rate payment. Compared to Niederle (2016), a superb survey that deals 
extensively with competitiveness, the 56 per cent in our sample is in line with the usual 
numbers reported in the literature. As explained already, we measured cognitive abilities 
using the Cognitive Reflection Test. Our measure Cognitive (CRT) reports the mean of the 
correct answers. Our mean of 1.36 correct answers is within the usual range and according to 
Frederick (2005) it places our sample between Harvard University (mean of 1.43) and 
University of Michigan (mean of 1.18). Remember that our quiz consisted of 8 questions, and 
the first three were those of the Cognitive Reflection Test, while the rest were general 
knowledge questions. Cognitive (knowledge) indicates the average number of correct 
answers to these questions. We use this measure as well as higher scores may capture 
abilities or knowledge not explained by the Cognitive Reflection Test. Female shows that 64 
per cent of the participants were females. Exam and GPA are our performance measures. 
Grades in an exam may range from 1 to 5, 5 being the best grade. Since the GPA is an average 
of the exam grades, in principle it also ranges from 1 to 5, but as shown by the data the actual 
range is more compressed. 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of our main variables 
 
Full sample With valid exam or GPA scores 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Time now 
(HUF) 
198 273 252 0 1100 150 285 252 0 1100 
Time later 
(HUF) 
198 295 265 0 1100 
150 319 271 0 1100 
Time now 
(discount factor) 198 0.92 0.07 0.69 1 150 0.92 0.07 0.69 1 
Time later 
(discount factor) 198 0.92 0.08 0.69 1 150 0.91 0.08 0.69 1 
Risk 242 1451 787 0 3000 183 1382 759 0 3000 
Uncertanity 241 1807 806 0 3000 182 1746 801 0 3000 
Present Bias 198 22 226 -1100 700 150 35 236 -1100 700 
Cooperativeness 239 2430 1241 0 4000 180 2499 1179 0 4000 
Competitiveness 241 0.56 0.5 0 1 183 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Cognitive (CRT) 242 1.36 1.04 0 3 183 1.14 1.04 0 4 
Cognitive 
(knowledge) 
242 1.14 1.01 0 4 
183 1.25 1.02 0 3 
Female 226 0.64 0.48 0 1 169 0.70 0.46 0 1 
Exam 149 2.95 1.26 1 5 149 2.95 1.26 1 5 
GPA 154 4.05 0.46 2.81 4.95 154 4.05 0.46 2.81 4.95 
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In Appendix A we report the survey in full. In Appendix B, we present to some detail the 
study by Dean and Ortoleva (2016), who have recent findings on the relationship between 
most of our variables within one experiment.20 Table 2a reports the the pairwise correlations 
between Dean and Ortoleva’s (2016) measures and Table 2b shows the correlation between 
our measures.21 We represent all correlations and signal the ones that are significant at 1 / 5 / 
10 % levels.   
Table 2a 
 Correlation coefficients and significance level between variables  
in Dean and Ortoleva (2016) 
                                                 
20 We are not aware of other experimental studies that investigate all these measures within one 
experiment. 
21 Dean and Ortoleva do not report the correlations between the last three variables (see Table 3 in 
Dean and Ortoleva (2016)). 
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Table 2b 
 Pairwise correlation between our variables 
 
 
 
 
 
Time now Time later 
Present 
bias 
Risk 
aversion 
Uncertanity 
aversion Cooperativeness Competitiveness 
Cognitive 
(CRT) 
Cognitive 
(knowledge) 
Time now 1 
        
Time later 0.621*** 1 
       
Present bias -0.390*** 0.480*** 1 
      
Risk aversion -0.117 -0.0485 0.0735 1 
     
Uncertanity aversion -0.102 -0.110 -0.0146 0.600*** 1 
    
Cooperativeness 0.0572 0.00604 -0.0569 -0.175** -0.117 1 
   
Competitiveness 0.0328 -0.0976 -0.151* -0.101 -0.0876 -0.00151 1 
  
Cognitive (CRT) -0.117 -0.150* -0.0461 0.266*** 0.367*** -0.0357 0.0273 1 
 Cognitive 
(knowledge) 0.0400 0.0489 0.0127 0.0509 0.0340 0.107 -0.000380 0.149* 1 
Female 0.0299 0.144* 0.133 -0.175** -0.289*** 0.120 -0.112 -0.386*** -0.0984 
Observations 242 
        
* p<0.05 
 ** 
p<0.01 
*** 
p<0.001" 
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Similarly to Dean and Ortoleva (2016), we find significant positive pairwise correlations 
(about 0.6) between present and future time preferences and between risk and uncertainty 
aversion, but while they report signiﬁcant positive relationship between measures of 
risk/uncertainty attitude and measured discount rates, we do not find such associations. 
Another result that we share with Dean and Ortoleva (2016) is the signiﬁcant negative 
relationship between measured discount rate and cognitive abilities (that they call 
intelligence, for details see Appendix B). Frederick (2005) reports that those who obtain a 
higher score in the Cognitive Reflection Test, are generally more patient. We see this finding 
in our measures as Time later is negatively related to cognitive abilities. Frederick (2005) also 
reports that in gambles involving gains (as our decisions 2 and 3) those with higher CRT 
score were more willing to gamble, a finding that neither we nor Dean and Ortoleva (2016) do 
share.22 In our experiment, participants with higher CRT score were betting lower amounts in 
decision 2 and 3. In our data, cognitive abilities correlate positively with risk and uncertainty 
aversion, and with time preferences at the longer horizon. Dean and Ortoleva (2016) only 
find negative correlation between cognitive abilities and time preferences at the more distant 
time horizon, but no significant correlation between cognitive abilities and  risk or 
uncertainty.  
Overall, the raw measures of the preferences that we study are in line with those found in 
the literature and the correlations between our measures resemble in most instances those in 
Dean and Ortoleva (2016).  
4. RESULTS 
4.1  LINEAR RELATIONSHIPS 
Our main question is whether and how the preferences that we measured are associated with 
school performance. Remember that we measure school performance using the exam results 
and also the GPA in the semester when the exam was taken. 
We note that pairwise correlations indicate that our performance measures are highly 
positively correlated (p-value<0.001) (see figure 1).  
 
 
 
                                                 
22 This finding has been confirmed by Dohmen et al. (2010). However, Andersson et al. (2015) show 
that this relationship may be spurious. 
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Figure 1 
 Linear and nonparametric association between the outcome variables 
 
In Table 3, we show a correlation table indicating the association between our 
performance measures and the preferences and traits that we measured in our experiment. 
 Table 3 
 Correlation between preferences and academic performance 
 
Time now Time later Present bias 
Risk 
aversion 
Uncertainty 
aversion 
Cooperativene
ss 
Exam -0.0833 -0.135 -0.0610 0.141 0.173* 0.0939 
GPA -0.0242 -0.0885 -0.0749 0.112 0.00465 0.00496 
       
 
Competitive
ness 
Cognitive 
(CRT) 
Cognitive 
(knowledge) Female Exam  
Exam 0.000947 0.310*** 0.101 -0.00324 1  
GPA 0.105 0.178* 0.122 0.208* 0.484***  
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
 
 
Most of our measured preferences do not seem to correlate well with school performance. 
Only uncertainty aversion has a marginally significant linear relationship with exam grades. 
But, unsurprisingly, individuals with better cognitive abilities perform better. Note however, 
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that only the CRT measure correlates well with grades, our other – self-made – measure of 
cognition is a much weaker tool. 
4.2  NON-LINEAR RELATIONSHIPS 
Although these correlations are suggestive, they are based on the assumption that the 
potential relationship is linear. To allow for possible non-linearities we consider local 
regressions that can be represented in an illustrative way using lowess smoothing. Below, we 
show all the lowess curves that depict the relationship between the preferences and the 
performance measures, along with their linear associations. These curves confirm mainly the 
findings seen in correlations, but also give way to other, non-linear associations, which might 
be very important for future research.23 
Risk and uncertainty aversion seem to have a positive effect on exam results, especially on 
the upper end of the distribution, but when considering GPA, the influence appears to be 
much smaller (Figure 2a). These associations are intuitive. At Eötvös Loránd University (our 
University) each student has a chance to retake all exams once per semester (and one exam 
per semester twice) without retaking the whole course. As our Economics exam is a twenty-
item four-choice multiple choice test, so risk loving students might go for their first exam less 
prepared hoping that they can get a pass without much effort. Naturally, this can negatively 
affect their received exam grades. Many of their other exams follow different grading 
techniques: home assignments, oral exams or continuous testing, which makes risk taking 
less beneficial; hence the much weaker effect of risk preferences on GPA. (But note that due 
to this logic and also to the fact the Economics is one grade in the GPA we would expect a 
positive association between risk aversion and GPA.) 
The measures related to time preferences behave as we expected based on the literature. 
More precisely, time preference is negatively related to exam results, but only on the upper 
half of the distribution. Students, whose weekly alternative costs are between 0 and 300 
forints (that is those who switch from the later 3500 Ft to the earlier payment when those 
payments are at least 3200 Ft), perform similary well, but those, who accept less instead of 
the 3500 HUF later payment, on average perform worse both on the exam and have worse 
GPA. Some outliers blur this relationship in the Time now case. This suggests that more 
impatient students tend to have worse grades (Figure 2b), a finding that is in line with most 
results in the literature. This non-linear relationship is especially striking between present 
bias and educational outcomes. In Figure 2c, we represent on the x-axis the difference 
between the switching points on the two horizons. Those participants who are in the negative 
range are future-biased as they are relatively more patient now. If this difference is zero, then 
                                                 
23 Note that on the x-axis in all figures we report minimum, median and maximum values in the given 
bivariate relation. 
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the participant is time-consistent, while in the positive range we have the present-biased 
individuals. The more present-biased a student is, the worse his/her performance is. The 
performance of future-biased students do not differ from their time-consistent peers.   
We have assumed that cooperativeness has a positive effect on the grades. Looking at the 
exam results we see this positive linear slope but the difference between the not at all 
cooperative students  and the very cooperative ones are slim. (see Figure 2d). However, 
cooperativeness seems to have a non-linear relationship with GPA. Students that offer little 
less than 2000 HUF for the others have the highest GPA and anyone under or over this 
amount perform worse (note that the median is around 2500). While it is intuitive that 
cooperativeness should have a higher effect on the GPA than on a single exam grade, the non-
linear effect of cooperativeness is non-trivial. 
Competitiveness looks to have no effect when considering the exam results, but there is a 
slight positive relationship regarding GPA (see Figure 2d), hinting at the possibility that more 
competitive students have better GPA. Note, that competitiveness was measured using the a 
small cognitive test. Thus, it might be wise to control for cognitive test scores to see a less 
biased relationhip between competitiveness and grades. 
Cognitive abilities, have an especially strong positive relationship with grades. Cognitive 
abilities measured by the CRT have a clear positive effect (in line with expectations), but the 
other questions that made up the quiz do not seem to be clearly related to academic 
performance (see Figure 2e). 
Figure 2a 
 Lowess curves of risk and uncertainty aversion and performance 
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Figure 2b 
Lowess curves of time preferences  and performance 
 
Figure 2c 
 Lowess curves of present bias and performance 
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Figure 2d 
 Lowess curves of cooperation competition and performance 
 
Figure 2e 
 Lowess curves of cognitive tests and performance 
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5. REGRESSIONS 
5.1  LINEAR RELATIONSHIPS 
As a next step, we see if the previous findings hold when we control for other variables, so we 
run OLS regressions. The lowess curves indicate that the relationships are linear in some 
cases, but non-linear in others. Whenever the bi-variate relations are linear, we will use the 
linear approximation, but for the time preferences we will experiment with non-linear 
functional forms as well.  
For regressions on the exam result we include exam-time fixed effects, and also cluster 
the standard errors on exam time. Although the Economics exams are multiple choice tests, 
they are not standardized, so it might be that the exam is harder at one time than at another. 
Also students from different faculties – Social Science and Computer Science – take exams at 
different times. By including exam time fixed effects we intend to control for these two 
potential confounding effects. 
For regressions on the GPA we included fixed effects for the study major. Assuming 
different departments grade differently and also that different majors have different subjects, 
this might – and sometimes do – change the results. We have also utilized the number of 
credits that students have gained: using the number of credits as frequency weights we give a 
higher weight to a student that takes more classes than another with fewer credits. We have 
clustered the standard errors on student level within these credit-weighted regressions. As a 
robustness check we also report the unweighted regressions. 
In all regressions below, we control for the gender of the student. This is especially 
important as gender balance is not even across faculties and majors.  
As can be seen in Tables 4a-c below, the regressions confirm most of the previous 
findings. The most solid result is that cognitive abilities measured by the Cognitive Reflection 
Test affect positively and significantly both exam results and the GPA (both when weighted 
and when not). Competitiveness seems to associate positively and significantly with GPA 
(both weighted and unweighted) once the gender and study-major fixed-effects are controlled 
for, and the point estimates of the exam grades are very similar to the GPA point estimates. 
Uncertainty / risk aversion is positively and significantly related to better exam results and 
GPA in the weighted regression. These linear regressions fail to detect any association 
between time preferences, present bias, cooperativeness and the educational performance.  
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Table 4a 
 Linear regressions of exam grades and preferences 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES exam exam exam exam exam exam exam exam exam 
                    
Time now (100HUF) -0.0364 
        
 
(0.0555) 
        Time later (100HUF) 
 
-0.0709 
       
  
(0.0403) 
       Risk aversion (100 HUF) 
  
0.0234 
      
   
(0.0152) 
      Uncertanity aversion (100 HUF) 
   
0.0290* 
     
    
(0.0152) 
     Present bias 
    
-0.0447 
    
     
(0.0605) 
    Cooperativeness (100 HUF) 
     
0.00844 
   
      
(0.0101) 
   Competitiveness 
      
0.114 
  
       
(0.353) 
  Cognitive (knowledge) 
       
0.146* 
 
        
(0.0775) 
 Cognitive (CRT) 
        
0.487*** 
         
(0.0868) 
Female -0.0343 0.0260 -0.0266 0.0738 -0.0229 -0.0569 -0.00557 0.00487 0.326 
 
(0.426) (0.413) (0.340) (0.321) (0.453) (0.386) (0.385) (0.367) (0.271) 
Constant 3.160*** 3.236*** 3.363*** 3.280*** 3.062*** 2.782*** 2.910*** 2.810*** 2.128*** 
 
(0.429) (0.373) (0.375) (0.356) (0.307) (0.382) (0.391) (0.262) (0.209) 
          Observations 121 121 139 138 121 138 139 139 139 
R-squared 0.093 0.108 0.133 0.140 0.095 0.124 0.117 0.127 0.233 
exam time FE y y y y y y y y y 
weights n n n n n n n n n 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4b 
Linear regressions of GPA and preferences – without weights 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES GPA GPA GPA GPA GPA GPA GPA GPA GPA 
                    
Time now (100HUF) -0.000268 
        
 
(0.0315) 
        Time later (100HUF) 
 
-0.0145 
       
  
(0.0263) 
       Risk aversion (100 HUF) 
  
0.0112 
      
   
(0.00558) 
      Uncertanity aversion (100 HUF) 
   
0.00141 
     
    
(0.00177) 
     Present bias 
    
-0.0178 
    
     
(0.0139) 
    Cooperativeness (100 HUF) 
     
0.000353 
   
      
(0.00238) 
   Competitiveness 
      
0.150* 
  
       
(0.0606) 
  Cognitive (CRT) 
       
0.0950*** 
 
        
(0.0164) 
 Cognitive (knowledge) 
        
0.0392 
         
(0.0276) 
Female 0.150 0.163* 0.195*** 0.210** 0.166* 0.204** 0.239*** 0.234** 0.212** 
 
(0.0764) (0.0631) (0.0405) (0.0493) (0.0716) (0.0523) (0.0430) (0.0538) (0.0491) 
Constant 3.956*** 3.992*** 4.108*** 3.919*** 3.949*** 3.894*** 3.791*** 3.784*** 3.855*** 
 
(0.133) (0.114) (0.104) (0.0333) (0.0564) (0.0638) (0.0446) (0.0441) (0.0270) 
          Observations 118 118 142 141 118 141 142 142 142 
R-squared 0.038 0.045 0.084 0.054 0.046 0.052 0.080 0.088 0.062 
major FE y y y y y y y y y 
freq. weights n n n n n n n n n 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4b 
 Linear regressions of GPA and preferences – with weights 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES GPA GPA GPA GPA GPA GPA GPA GPA GPA 
                    
Time now (100HUF) -0.00435 
        
 
(0.0161) 
        Time later (100HUF) 
 
-0.0139 
       
  
(0.0185) 
       Risk aversion (100 HUF) 
  
0.0116** 
      
   
(0.00531) 
      Uncertanity aversion (100 HUF) 
   
0.000825 
     
    
(0.00473) 
     Present bias 
    
-0.0123 
    
     
(0.0188) 
    Cooperativeness (100 HUF) 
     
0.000400 
   
      
(0.00366) 
   Competitiveness 
      
0.139* 
  
       
(0.0819) 
  Cognitive (CRT) 
       
0.0994** 
 
        
(0.0402) 
 Cognitive (knowledge) 
        
0.0477 
         
(0.0369) 
Female 0.154 0.167 0.194** 0.208** 0.166 0.203** 0.235** 0.231** 0.212** 
 
(0.108) (0.106) (0.0904) (0.0947) (0.110) (0.0965) (0.0954) (0.0974) (0.0950) 
Constant 3.993*** 4.016*** 4.143*** 3.941*** 3.975*** 3.921*** 3.827*** 3.810*** 3.871*** 
 
(0.121) (0.116) (0.118) (0.107) (0.0966) (0.138) (0.108) (0.104) (0.0964) 
          Observations 3,572 3,572 4,274 4,245 3,572 4,246 4,274 4,274 4,274 
R-squared 0.039 0.045 0.083 0.052 0.043 0.051 0.074 0.089 0.065 
major FE y y y y y y y y y 
freq. weights y y y y y y y y y 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
         
28 
 
5.2  NON-LINEAR RELATIONSHIPS 
As we have argued above time preferences seem to have a non-linear relationship with 
grades. Both patience (Time Now and Time Later) as well as their differenes, the present 
bias, seem to correlate strongly with exam results and GPA but only on specific intervals on 
the lowess curves. In the regressions below we show that this partial relationship is also 
statistically significant. 
Table 5 below shows that patience and present bias correlates significantly with exam 
results and that the correlation with GPA is also negative but insignificant on conventional 
levels. Moreover, Table 6 also shows that the squared function of Time Later significantly 
relates to both exam grades and the GPA (and that the estimation with Time Now has similar 
but insignificant point estimates due to a couple of outliers at the upper end).  
Besides the facevalue of the lowess curves above these relations are also theoretically 
sound: we find that large present bias has a negative association with exam grades (but not 
GPA), but also that future bias has no relation to either exam grades or GPA. Also patience 
(concretely, our Time Later variable) matters especially for those, who are very impatient. 
Our estimates of time preference – as any – is inherently imperfect, thus we do not find much 
difference with not or little impatient student. However, students who value the future much 
less than the present also perform worse in school, as school is a very tipical investment in 
the future. 
Table 5 
 Regressions of grades and present bias 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES exam GPA GPA 
        
Future bias (100HUF) 0.0276 0.00843 0.0106 
 
(0.0629) (0.0240) (0.0169) 
Present bias (100HUF) -0.131** -0.0467 -0.0442 
 
(0.0418) (0.0228) (0.0343) 
Female -0.00526 0.167* 0.179 
 
(0.444) (0.0710) (0.108) 
Constant 3.162*** 3.989*** 3.990*** 
 
(0.312) (0.0800) (0.101) 
    Observations 121 118 3,423 
R-squared 0.110 0.061 0.060 
exam time FE y 
  weights n n y 
faculty FE   y y 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
29 
 
Table 6a 
 Regressions of grades and time now 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES exam exam GPA GPA GPA GPA 
              
Time now (100HUF) -0.0364 -0.0522 -0.000268 0.0343 -0.000488 0.0358 
 
(0.0555) (0.113) (0.0315) (0.0582) (0.0162) (0.0344) 
Time now, squared (100 HUF) 
 
0.00220 
 
-0.00477 
 
-0.00499 
  
(0.0128) 
 
(0.00387) 
 
(0.00354) 
Female -0.0343 -0.0312 0.150 0.145 0.165 0.158 
 
(0.426) (0.420) (0.0764) (0.0776) (0.104) (0.102) 
Constant 3.160*** 3.171*** 3.956*** 3.931*** 3.956*** 3.931*** 
 
(0.429) (0.463) (0.133) (0.154) (0.116) (0.122) 
       Observations 121 121 118 118 3,423 3,423 
R-squared 0.093 0.093 0.038 0.047 0.039 0.049 
exam time FE y y 
    weights n n n n y y 
major FE     y y y y 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 6b 
 Regressions of grades and time later 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES exam exam GPA GPA GPA GPA 
              
Time later (100HUF) -0.0709 0.0734 -0.0145 0.0898 -0.0125 0.0942** 
 
(0.0403) (0.0910) (0.0263) (0.0622) (0.0180) (0.0390) 
Time later, squared (100 HUF) 
 
-0.0194* 
 
-0.0136** 
 
-0.0140*** 
  
(0.00894) 
 
(0.00443) 
 
(0.00480) 
Female 0.0260 0.0215 0.163* 0.177* 0.177* 0.189* 
 
(0.413) (0.407) (0.0631) (0.0679) (0.102) (0.0983) 
Constant 3.236*** 3.116*** 3.992*** 3.892*** 3.987*** 3.885*** 
 
(0.373) (0.395) (0.114) (0.165) (0.111) (0.113) 
       Observations 121 121 118 118 3,423 3,423 
R-squared 0.108 0.126 0.045 0.120 0.044 0.121 
exam time FE y y 
    weights n n n n y y 
major FE     y y y y 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The other preference, where we have seen a possible non-linear effect was 
cooperativeness. As seen in the regressions in Table 7 below a quadratic function describes 
the data better than the linear one, especially with GPA as dependent variable. Based on 
these estimates those, who have contributed to little over 2000HUF to the public good 
perform around 0.3 grades better than those, who have contributed nothing or everything to 
the pot. This is a significant difference. 
Table 7 
 Regressions of grades and cooperativeness 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES exam exam GPA GPA GPA GPA 
              
Cooperativeness  
(100 HUF) 0.00844 0.0270 0.000353 0.0277*** 0.000414 0.0278** 
 
(0.0101) (0.0326) (0.00238) (0.00421) (0.00375) (0.0113) 
Cooperativeness 
squared (100 HUF) 
 
-0.000433 
 
-0.000646*** 
 
-0.000648*** 
  
(0.000730) 
 
(0.000117) 
 
(0.000238) 
Female -0.0569 -0.0658 0.204** 0.187** 0.215** 0.197** 
 
(0.386) (0.379) (0.0523) (0.0603) (0.0941) (0.0873) 
Constant 2.782*** 2.655*** 3.894*** 3.718*** 3.892*** 3.717*** 
 
(0.382) (0.498) (0.0638) (0.0677) (0.141) (0.154) 
       Observations 138 138 141 141 4,090 4,090 
R-squared 0.124 0.127 0.052 0.107 0.054 0.109 
exam time FE y y 
    weights n n n n y y 
major FE     y y y y 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
5.3  MULTIVARIATE LINEAR REGRESSIONS 
Although the number of observations in our study is not very large, and thus running 
multivariate regressions risks the problem of overidentification, we still experimented with 
the inclusion of more than one preference in the regressions.  
First of all, as we have shown above both risk aversion and non-linear time preferences 
(or present bias) associate with grades. These two preferences might signal the same non-
cognitive trait, as impatience or present bias can easily stem from an inherent dispreference 
towards risk (cf. future is risky). Including both preferences in one regression (see table 8), 
however, does not affect the point estimates or their significance.24 This suggests that risk 
aversion and time preferences are indeed different non-cognitive traits (Andreoni and 
Sprenger, 2012), which both relate, independently, to school performance. 
                                                 
24 Note: we use Time Later to proxy impatience as it suffers less from outliers. 
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Table 8 
 Multivariate regressions of time preferences, risk aversion and grades 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES exam GPA GPA exam GPA GPA 
              
Future bias (100HUF) 0.0106 0.00561 0.00746 
   
 
(0.0667) (0.0271) (0.0178) 
   Present bias (100HUF) -0.136** -0.0485 -0.0454 
   
 
(0.0427) (0.0252) (0.0350) 
   Time later (100HUF) 
   
0.0733 0.0831 0.0857** 
    
(0.0989) (0.0594) (0.0367) 
Time later, squared (100 HUF) 
   
-0.0192* -0.0129** -0.0131*** 
    
(0.00950) (0.00395) (0.00434) 
Risk aversion (100 HUF) 0.0281* 0.0124 0.0138** 0.0265 0.0108 0.0123** 
 
(0.0147) (0.00681) (0.00592) (0.0170) (0.00558) (0.00542) 
Female 0.00819 0.168** 0.180* 0.0277 0.176** 0.189** 
 
(0.397) (0.0500) (0.0995) (0.369) (0.0493) (0.0918) 
Constant 3.589*** 4.200*** 4.226*** 3.526*** 4.087*** 4.108*** 
 
(0.414) (0.0777) (0.130) (0.478) (0.0873) (0.136) 
       Observations 121 118 3,423 121 118 3,423 
R-squared 0.136 0.097 0.104 0.150 0.147 0.156 
exam time FE y 
     weights n n y n n y 
major FE   y y y y y 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
On a different note, one might argue that competitiveness matters only through higher 
cognitive test scores. Remember, competitiveness was measures using a small cognitive test. 
If a student knew that s/he was performing badly on that small test, she was less likely to opt 
for the competitive payment. Thus, including both cognitive scores in the regression could 
show whether they alter the association of competitiveness and performance (see table 9). 
Apparently this association does not depend on the cognitive scores of the students.  
Students, who opted for the competitive payment on average receive 0.13 higher grades, even 
after controlling for their cognitive test scores. And this effect is marginally significant for the 
GPA.  
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Table 9 
 Multivariate regressions of competitiveness, cognitive skills and grades 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES exam GPA GPA 
        
Competitiveness 0.136 0.143* 0.132 
 (0.275) (0.0646) (0.0808) 
Cognitive (knowledge) 0.0955 0.0364 0.0419 
 (0.0866) (0.0314) (0.0346) 
Cognitive (CRT) 0.475*** 0.0818*** 0.0861** 
 (0.0888) (0.0166) (0.0407) 
Female 0.350 0.264*** 0.275*** 
 (0.281) (0.0469) (0.0955) 
Constant 1.947*** 3.648*** 3.642*** 
 (0.318) (0.0558) (0.135) 
    
Observations 139 142 4,120 
R-squared 0.240 0.115 0.118 
exam time FE y   
weights n n y 
major FE   y y 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
clustered se in parentheses    
 
Finally, plugging (almost) all variable in the regression (table 10) below does not really 
change the conclusions. Of course, as the power of our analysis is rather small, it eliminates 
some significant effects, and while some point estimates also decreased a little (e.g. time 
preferences) the main direction of associations remain, suggesting we were quite successful 
in finding and measuring independent preferences.  
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Table 10 
 Multivariate regressions of (almost) all preferences and grades 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES exam GPA GPA exam GPA GPA 
Future bias (100HUF) 0.0227 0.0146 0.0159 
   
 
(0.0485) (0.0182) (0.0150) 
   Present bias 0 (100HUF) -0.130*** -0.0293 -0.0268 
   
 
(0.0397) (0.0329) (0.0315) 
   Time later (100HUF) 
   
-0.0529 0.0573 0.0601 
    
(0.100) (0.0401) (0.0371) 
Time later, squared (100 HUF) 
   
-0.00410 -0.00869** -0.00899* 
    
(0.0131) (0.00282) (0.00464) 
Risk aversion (100 HUF) 0.0170 0.0113 0.0121** 0.0160 0.0105 0.0113** 
 
(0.0170) (0.00834) (0.00569) (0.0196) (0.00766) (0.00563) 
Cooperativeness (100 HUF) 0.0501 0.0392** 0.0382*** 0.0512 0.0334** 0.0324*** 
 
(0.0460) (0.0134) (0.0110) (0.0532) (0.0115) (0.0111) 
Cooperativeness squared (100 HUF) -0.00101 -0.000928** -0.000905*** -0.00100 -0.000802** -0.000777*** 
 
(0.000991) (0.000287) (0.000249) (0.00108) (0.000246) (0.000260) 
Competitiveness 0.206 0.191*** 0.178* 0.229 0.181*** 0.163* 
 
(0.376) (0.0346) (0.0942) (0.385) (0.0328) (0.0930) 
Cognitive (CRT) 0.456*** 0.0771* 0.0818* 0.468*** 0.0757* 0.0790* 
 
(0.0919) (0.0343) (0.0489) (0.104) (0.0301) (0.0474) 
Cognitive (knowledge) 0.135 -0.00407 0.000671 0.124 -0.00763 -0.00251 
 
(0.107) (0.0480) (0.0373) (0.0864) (0.0497) (0.0380) 
Female 0.275 0.190** 0.201** 0.329 0.202*** 0.213** 
 
(0.391) (0.0450) (0.0942) (0.397) (0.0401) (0.0894) 
Constant 1.912** 3.695*** 3.712*** 1.924** 3.668*** 3.688*** 
 
(0.640) (0.0396) (0.184) (0.704) (0.0721) (0.180) 
       Observations 120 117 3,393 120 117 3,393 
R-squared 0.285 0.231 0.231 0.293 0.251 0.253 
exam time FE y n n y n n 
major FE  n y y n  y y 
weights n n y n n y 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Our paper has aimed to be a frontrunner in connecting laboratory-based measures of 
preferences with real-life measures of school success. Being an exploratory pilot study we 
experimented with four different preferences, which, according to the literature, might 
have an impact on school performance. We measure in an incentivized way risk, time, 
social and competitive preferences and also cognitive abilities of university students and 
attempted to find associations between these measures and two important academic 
outcome measures: exam results and GPA. 
We find consistently that cognitive abilities are very well correlated with school 
performance. We used the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick 2005) to proxy cognitive 
skills and found that it explains grades on the Economics exam extremely well, and also 
associates well with the more general GPA.  
Regarding non-cognitive skills, we find suggestive evidence for many of four measured 
preferences. 
First of all, the most emphatic non-cognitive skill in the literature is time preference (see 
also: conscientiousness, or self-control, or discipline). We used two alternative measures 
of time preference: patience and present bias. We measured patience as a choice between 
different amounts of money at different points in time. The more an individual values 
future payoffs, the more patient she is. Moreover, if an individual is more impatient on 
the short-term horizon than on the long-term, then she exhibits present bias that may 
make it hard for the individual to make efforts immediately, and she tends to 
procrastinate efforts and costs. While these two indicators of time preference seem to act 
similarly for both measures of school performance, it is the present bias that explains 
exam grades relatively better, and patience that explains GPA better. We have also 
pinpointed that both measures of time preferences have a non-linear relation to school 
performance. Students exhibiting future bias (those who are more patient on the short 
run than on the long run) perform similarly to time-consistent students (who are just as 
patient in the short as in the long run). However, the more present-biased a student is, 
the worse her grades are. Similarly, patience does not differentiate between very patient 
and a between little impatient students, however very impatient students seem to 
perform worse in school. 
Economists might be pleased to hear that competitiveness seems to matter. At least this 
is what we find. Students, who opt for a more competitive payment scheme in our 
experiments seem to have a little higher average GPA and better exam grades. This, 
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however, might be confounded by the gender of the students. Unfortunately, we could 
not study this aspect, as our sample was seriously gender imbalanced across faculties 
(Social Science students are mainly girls while boys are more likely come from the 
Computer Science faculty). 
We have also seen that risk-averse students perform a little better than risk loving 
students. And that risk preferences matter a slightly bit more for the exam grade than for 
the general GPA. In case of multiple choice exams it makes perfect sense for risk loving 
students to go for their first try less prepared, as the possibility of passing as exam just by 
chance is not zero. Thus, the expected exam grades of risk lovers tend to be lower, which 
might affect their GPA as well. 
Finally, we have also detected that cooperative preferences – the amount of money 
offered in a public good game – associates strongly with GPA, but in a non-linear way. 
Students who offered around half of their possible amounts had significantly higher 
GPAs than those, who offered none or all their money. We do not find this effect for 
exam grades, and have no real theoretical explanations for the non-linear relationship. 
All in all, we consider this research a pilot. All our results can be considered preliminary, 
for three reasons. First, although our sample size is relatively large for an experimental 
study, we still run the risk of overidentification when looking at several preferences 
simultaneously. Second, although our experiments were incentivized, these incentives 
were relatively small, as we could only pay a couple of students per class based on their 
decisions. Third, although these preference measures are relatively well established in 
the behavioural economics literature, they are not at all validated in the economics of 
education studies. It might be that time preferences – as we measure them – are but 
poor proxies of more important non-cognitive traits (as self-discipline, for instance, see 
Duckworth and Seligman, 2005), and that cooperativeness should matter not on the 
individual but on the group level. Thus, we intend this research to generate debate and 
inspire future research, which could underline or falsify our findings. 
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APPENDIX A – INSTRUCTIONS 
Dear participant! 
You particpate in a scientific research carried out by Dániel Horn and Hubert János Kiss, 
assistant professors at Eötvös Loránd University. 
Participation is VOLUNTARY. You can interrupt the experiment at any moment or 
refuse to answer the questions without giving any explanation. 
Participation is ANONYMOUS. We treat any information gathered in this research 
confidentially. However, we would like to ask for your NEPTUN code as it is an 
important part of the research to lint the results of this experiment with your academic 
results. After linking the data, we will erase your code. 
Neptun code:    __________ 
The results of this experiment will be used for research purposes carried out at the 
Department of Economics, Faculty of Social Sciences, Eötvös Loránd University. 
Thanks for particpating in this experiment! 
INSTRUCTIONS 
In this experiment each participant makes decisions in six different and independent 
situations. You may earn money depending on yoir choices! The maximum earning is 
7100 Ft. 
At the end of the experiment we select randomly to participants who will 
receive their earnings in cash. 
The selection will be as follows: Each answer sheet has two tags in the upper right 
corner with a number on them. (Please, check that the numbers on the tag are identical 
with the number of the answer sheet!) 1) Keep one of the tags; 2) hand in the other tag 
with the answer sheet after you have completed the experiment. We will select randomly 
two numbers that identify two participants, and using a die we will select one of the 
situations in which you made the decisions. The decisions of the chosen participants will 
determine their earnings. The selection takes place once everybody hended in the answer 
sheets and earnings will be paid immediately (or depending on the situation in 1,2 or 3 
weeks). 
PLEASE, DO NOT SPEAK WITH OTHER PARTICIPANTS DURING THE 
EXPERIMENT. SHOULD YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, PLEASE TURN TO 
THE ADMINISTRATORS OF THE EXPERIMENT!
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SITUATION 1 
You will be randomly matched with another participant in this room and both of you 
recieve 4000 Ft. You and the other participant independently may contribute any 
amount (between 0 and 4000 Ft) from this initial endowment to a joint account. After 
contribution both of you will receive the 70% of the total contribution. Your final earning 
consists of the money not contriuted to the joint account plus the money received from 
the joint account. 
For example, if you contribute 3000 Ft, while the other participant 4000 Ft, then there 
will be 7000 Ft on the joint account. 70% of this amount is 4900 Ft, hence this the 
amount that both of you receive from the joint account. Since you contributed 3000 Ft 
out of 4000 Ft, so you have still 1000 Ft left, and consequently your final earning is 
4900+1000=5900 Ft. 
The next table shows some possible contributions and the ensuing earnings. (Note: 
youare free to choose any contribution, you are not restricted to the numbers shown in 
the table.) 
Contribution 
of 
participant 1 
Contribution 
of 
participant 2 
Joint 
account 
Earning of 
participant 
1 
Earning of 
participant 
2 
3000 4000 7000 5900 4900 
3000 2000 5000 4500 5500 
0 0 0 4000 4000 
4000 0 4000 2800 6800 
4000 4000 8000 5600 5600 
 
How much do you contribute to the joint account? 
  ______________ Ft 
If the payoff at the end of the experiment occurs according to this situation, then the 
selected participants will receive the final earnings. 
(In the original answer sheets, each situation was presented on a new sheet. To save 
space here, we present the situations compressed.) 
SITUATION 2 
Suppose that you receive 3000 Ft and you can use part of that amount to place a bet 
(between 0 and 3000 Ft) on a colour in the next gamble. 
There is a bag that contains 10 black and 10 red balls. We will draw one. If the colour of 
the ball drawn coincides with your bet, then we double the amount of your bet. 
 
How much would you bet? 
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Amount of the bet:     __________ Ft 
Selected colour:    __________ 
If the payoff at the end of the experiment occurs according to this situation, then the 
selected participants will receive the amount of money nout used for the bet (3000-bet) 
and the money won on the bet. 
SITUATION 3 
This situation is quite similar to the previous one, but there is an important difference. 
Suppose that you receive 3000 Ft and you can use part of that amount to place a bet 
(between 0 and 3000 Ft) on a colour in the next gamble. 
There is a bag with black and red balls, but it is unknown how many of the balls are black 
/ red. We will draw a ball and if the colour of the ball drawn coincides with your bet, then 
we double the amount of your bet. 
How much would you bet? 
Amount of the bet:     __________ Ft 
Selected colour:    __________ 
If the payoff at the end of the experiment occurs according to this situation, then the 
selected participants will receive the amount of money nout used for the bet (3000-bet) 
and the money won on the bet. 
OPTIONAL TASK 
This task is optional 
If you find the solution of the following maze and you will be selected, then we give you 
an additional 300 Ft on top of the other earnings. 
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SITUATION 4  
In this situation you have to choose between earnings today and earnings in the future. 
You may decide to have 3500 Ft in a week or a lower amount today. Choose according to 
if you prefer a given amount today or 3500 Ft in a week. Mark one of the possibilities in 
each row. 
 
If the payoff at the end of the experiment occurs according to this situation, then first we 
select which of the above question will determine the earning. The selected participant 
will receive her / his earning according to her / his choice for the selected question and 
the earning will be paid immediately or in a week. If according to her / his choice the 
earning is to be paid in a week, then we put the corresponding amount of money in a 
sealed envelope that she / he will receive next week in this class from the professor. If 
this arrengement is not convenient for her / him, then she / he can collect the money at 
any time after the class in a week at the secretary of the Department of Economics 
(E3.59). 
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SITUATION 5 
This situation is very similar to the previous one, but now you have to choose between 
amounts of money to be received in two or three weeks. 
Choose according to if you prefer a given amount in two weeks or 3500 Ft in three weeks. 
Mark one of the possibilities in each row. 
 
If the payoff at the end of the experiment occurs according to this situation, then first we 
select which of the above question will determine the earning. The selected participant 
will receive her / his earning according to her / his choice for the selected question and 
the earning will be paid according to her / his choice. We put the corresponding amount 
of money in a sealed envelope that she / he will receive in this class from the professor on 
the corresponding week. If this arrengement is not convenient for her / him, then she / 
he can collect the money at any time after that class at the secretary of the Department of 
Economics (E3.59). 
QUIZ 
Next you find a quiz of 8 questions that is necessary for situation 6. Please answer the 
questions before proceeding. You are not allowed to use any help. After completing the 
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quiz, please answer the following questions that will determine your earnings for this 
situation. (We will tell the correct answers of the quiz at the end of the experiment.) 
1. 4 cats eat 4 cans of cat food in 4 days. How long does it take for 
40 cats to eat 40 cans?   
2. In a pond, algae begin to expand and each day it doubles the 
surface covered. If it covers the entire pond in 10 days, how long 
does it take to cover half of the pond? 
3. A flashlight with battery costs $3.3. The flashlight costs $3 more 
than the battery. How much does the battery cost?   
4. How many neighbouring country does Switzerland have?    
5. How many carbon atoms does a glucose molecule have?    
6. How many verses does an elegiac couplet have?    
7. How many members should the Hungarian Constituional Court 
have at least?   
8. How many seasons did the series „Friends” have?  
 
What do you think, how many of the questions did you 
answer correctly? 
 
__________ 
SITUATION 6 
Choose a compensation scheme for your answers given in the quiz. You may choose to 
be paid according to the number of correct answers. In this case, you will receive 250 
Ft for each correct answer. Alternatively, you may choose to be paired randomly with 
two other participants and if the number of correct answers that you gave is higher 
than any of the other two participants, then you will receive 4500 Ft. In case of a tie 
(with the participant that had more correct answers), you will receive 2500 Ft. If the 
number of correct answers that you gave is less than the number of correct answers of 
the participant that scored better, then you receive nothing. 
 
What do you choose? (Underline your choice) 
 
Being paid according to the number of correct answers 
OR 
Being paid after comparing with two randomly chosen participants 
 
If the payoff at the end of the experiment occurs according to this situation, then the 
selected participant receives the amount according to the chosen scheme. She / he 
receives an extra 250 Ft if she / he correctly guessed the number of correct answers. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
Gender: 
Year of birth: 
Educational attainment 
Vocational school 
High school 
BA degree 
MA degree 
other: _________________ 
We thank for your cooperation! When you finish, please let it know the 
experimenters so the he can collect the answer sheets. Remember to keep 
one of the number tags. 
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APPENDIX B – MEASUREMENT VALIDATION: DEAN AND ORTOLEVA 
(2016) 
Dean and Ortoleva (2016) have measured in a single experiment with 190 subjects many 
of the preferences that we have investigated also.  
Dean and Ortoleva (2016) measure time preferences (they call them discount rates) as 
we do, that is using lists of choices that involve different amounts of money at different 
points in time. However, the amounts of money and the time horizons are different. 
Related to time preferences, they also measure present bias that captures the idea that 
individuals tend to exhibit higher discount rates when the payment is available 
immediately.  
Dean and Ortoleva (2016) measure risk aversion by eliciting certainty equivalents in 
three 50/50 lotteries and the difference between the expected value of the lottery and the 
certainty equivalent is taken as risk aversion. We use also a 50/50 lottery, but we 
measure risk aversion as the amount of money that the individuals are willing to bet on 
that lottery. Dean and Ortoleva (2016) also measure uncertainty aversion (that they call 
ambiguity aversion) in the same vein as we do. 
Dean and Ortoleva (2016) do not measure social preferences as we do, but they use the 
trust game to capture social concerns. Given the difference in the measures, no direct 
comparison can be made. Dean and Ortoleva (2016) do not measure competitive 
preferences. 
They gauge cognitive skills with Raven’s Matrices, a standard measure of perceptual 
reasoning. Similarly to us, they also assess overconfidence (they call it overestimation) as 
the difference between the number of questions that they think they got right in the test 
and the number of actual performance in the test. 
